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Abstract
The caste issue dominates a large part of India's social and political life. Caste
shapes Indians' identities, and strong tensions exist between castes. This paper
evaluates how caste-based comparisons may be exacerbated in such a con°ictual
context. Using subjective well-being data from an original panel survey, together
with a national representative survey on expenditure, we ¯nd that both within-caste
comparisons and between-rival-caste comparisons reduce well-being. Between-caste
comparisons a®ect well-being three times more than within-caste comparisons. In
absolute value, an increase in rival castes' expenditure a®ects well-being as much
as own expenditure. These ¯ndings highlight the strength of comparisons between
rival castes. Yet this comparison scheme turns out to be asymmetrical: only low
castes care about the economic successes of their rivals, and only high-caste Indians
compete with their fellows.
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1 Introduction
India is one of the rare countries with a clear social strati¯cation. Identity is deeply
rooted in caste at birth. Caste also largely de¯nes position in society and the economy.
Importantly, there is strong antagonism between castes. This antagonism often takes the
form of discrimination, and sometimes violence. In addition, low castes have called for {
and are still calling for { reservations in education and the labor market to o®set their
situation.
This paper aims at evaluating whether caste-based comparisons are exacerbated in
this environment. While many studies have established that individuals' well-being can
be a®ected by the consumption/income of others (see Clark et al. 2008 for a survey), a
relatively newer, and still open, question is if people with speci¯c characteristics tend
to compare themselves to certain types of rivals. This question is answered in part by
Clark and Senik (2010) for European countries. India provides rare material to contribute
to this line of research, as this country is one of the very few to be characterized by well-
de¯ned social groups and strong between-group tensions.
We use subjective well-being data to assess the strength of within and between-caste
comparisons in India. More speci¯cally, we make joint use of two data sets. The ¯rst
one is an original urban panel survey for India conducted by Osaka University, Japan. A
nice advantage of the survey is that it contains a happiness question, making it a rare
example among surveys conducted in developing countries. The second data set is a large,
representative Indian population survey. This second survey enables us to estimate the
expenditure of the groups to which respondents are likely to compare themselves.
Our main results are threefold. Firstly, within-caste comparisons a®ect well-being
negatively. This result suggests that expenditure by others from the same caste triggers
envy more than it acts as a positive signal about own future consumption. This ¯nding
di®ers from what might have been expected in such a rapidly growing and changing
country (Senik 2004, Senik 2008). Secondly, Indians view the rival castes' economic
situation enviously. Between-caste comparisons are unexpectedly strong and, in absolute
value, comparisons to rival castes a®ect well-being as much as own expenditure does. We
found that they matter for happiness three times more than within-caste comparisons.
Thirdly and most importantly, this comparison pattern appears to be asymmetrical: low
castes indeed compare themselves to higher castes, but the reverse is not true. Besides,
within-caste comparisons are mostly made by members of high castes. These results hold
both when pooling the cross-sections and when adding individual ¯xed-e®ects into the
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regression.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our concep-
tual framework. After providing some background elements on the Indian caste system
and on the tensions in this society, we discuss the importance that economic comparisons
may have in this society. We then review the existing literature on comparisons in India,
as well as on between-group comparisons in other countries. The third section details our
data sets, as one of our data sets is original. The fourth section provides empirical results
and the last section concludes the paper.
2 Research Background
2.1 A Con°ictual Caste Society
Although 3,000 years old, the caste system continues to play a central role in India.1
This system divides Indians into four classes (varna) and thousands of small communities
(jati). The ¯rst Indian Constitution (1950) groups the di®erent jati into four broader
categories, depending on the level of disadvantage and social stigma they face. This
typology simpli¯es the study of caste inequalities, and will be used throughout this paper.
To be speci¯c, caste determines an individuals level of pureness. First, the Scheduled
Castes (\untouchables", or Dalits) and the Scheduled Tribes (the tribals) are considered
as \impure". Above them are the Other Backward Castes. Even though the castes
composing this latter category are mostly considered as \pure", they are still beneath the
rest of the population in the caste hierarchy, and su®er from the caste system. Lastly, the
rest of the population is categorized as the Other.
This caste system is not just a clustering. It is a social ordering. Caste profoundly
in°uences one's role and position in society (occupation, marriage, with whom one can
interact, etc.). For example, for an orthodox Hindu from the highest castes, interacting
with low-caste members may even soil purity. As a matter of fact, Indians still mostly
marry within their own jati (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006)). This rigid hierarchy is a
source of con°ict between the classes, and generates massive economic inequalities. It
translates social inequalities into economic inequalities, because low-paid \impure occu-
pations" (cleaning, undertaking, etc.) are reserved for lower castes.
Despite large reservations for the disadvantaged castes in education and the admin-
1This section draws substantially on Susan Bayly's 2001 general survey of the recent history of India
as a caste society.
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istration since the 1950s (Bayly (2001), chapter 7), between-caste economic disparities
remain striking. In terms of per capita household expenditure, Indians from higher castes
consume on average 63% and 46% more than, respectively, Scheduled Tribes and Sched-
uled Castes,2 and 27% more than the Other Backward Castes.3 A large body of literature
documents the discrimination from which low-caste members su®er. On the labor mar-
ket, for example, the persistency of this discrimination has been assessed using both
non-experimental (e.g. Banerjee and Knight (1985)) and experimental methods (testing
methods: Banerjee et al. (2009), Siddique (2011)). Low castes also face discrimination on
the housing market.4 Yet disadvantaged castes actively struggle to extend the reservation
policies they bene¯t from, sometimes even asking for quotas in the private sector.5 Symp-
tomatic of these tensions are the violent con°icts { or \caste wars" that °are up in rural
India on a regular basis.6 Symptomatic also is the preponderant role of these tensions in
India's political life from Independence onwards.7
2.2 Previous Findings on Class Con°icts
A few papers show relative concerns playing an important role in India based, for instance,
on wedding expenditure (Bloch et al. (2004)) and more broadly conspicuous consumption
(Khamis et al. (2012)). Carlsson et al. (2009) assess more speci¯cally the role of caste-
based relative concerns in India, on the basis of a hypothetical choice experiment. They
asked respondents to choose between several hypothetical societies for their grandchildren.
Each of these societies is characterized by the grandchild's income, the average income
for the grandchild's caste, and the average income for society. The authors derive respon-
dents' preferences from the choices made by the respondents. They ¯nd the caste's average
income to reduce utility, generating evidence of negative within-caste comparisons. Keep-
ing both own and caste income constant, society's average income also a®ects well-being
negatively. The coe±cient associated with society's income appears to be higher than
the coe±cient associated with own caste income, making a case that Indians compare
themselves even more to the rest of society (including rival castes) than to people from
2Authors' computation based on the 2009-10 round of the National Sample Survey, with a sample size
of 570 000 individuals.
3Even in the historically highly egalitarian, anti-caste state of Kerala, Deshpande (2000) ¯nds caste
disparities driving overall inequalities.
4Bayly (2001), pp. 359-362.
5Bayly (2001), chapter 7.
6Bayly (2001), chapter 9, pp. 342-358.
7Cf. the rise of the anti-reservation party BJP in the 80s and 90s (Bayly (2001), pp.296-300).
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their own caste.
A few other papers also seek to ¯nd out which groups individuals compare themselves
to, although not in India. In European countries, Clark and Senik (2010) use a survey
in which respondents were directly asked to whom they compare themselves, and ¯nd
that Europeans compare themselves predominantly to their colleagues. Another trend in
the literature includes the income/consumption level of plausible reference groups in the
well-being equation to check for between-group comparisons. Using this methodology,
Kingdon and Knight (2007) study income comparisons in South Africa, ¯nding evidence
of between-race comparison. Jiang et al. (2011) and Akay et al. (2012) focus on the re-
lation between rural-to-urban migrants and urban \natives" in China. All three papers
conclude similarly that, whereas within-group comparisons a®ect well-being negatively,
between-group comparisons make people feel they are better o®. This phenomenon can
be understood from the point of view that the other group's economic situation acts as a
positive signal about the future level of income in one's own group.
2.3 Speci¯cation and Prediction
In keeping with the literature, we consider the standard relative utility function:
(1) Ui = ¯yln(yi) + ¯cln(ycastei) + ¯rln(yrivali) + ¯Xit;
where yi stands for i's own expenditure, ycastei represents i's caste expenditure level, yrivali
is the expenditure level in the rival castes, and Xit stands for a set of socio-demographic
characteristics. This logarithmic-type speci¯cation is widely used to model relative util-
ity.8 Section 4 details the speci¯cation of each variable.
We saw in section 2.1 that caste class con°icts are between the \pure" and the \im-
pure." Hence, caste rivalry is de¯ned as Other Castes (i.e. higher castes) versus the rest
of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Castes. It is true that,
to some extent, some Indians from the Other Backward Castes have seen the Scheduled
Tribes as a threat. Tensions are also known to exist between Other Backward Castes and
Scheduled Castes.9 However, due to the limited size of our sample, this paper sticks to
the main focus of \pure" vs. \impure."
In the speci¯cation, our prime interest is with the sign of ¯c and ¯r. The sign of
¯c is hard to predict. The envy and conspicuous consumption theories (Veblen (1899),
8See Clark et al. (2008) for a development of the model and a literature review.
9See Bayly (2001), chapter 9 for this point.
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Duesenberry (1949)) posit that an increase in others' expenditure makes one feel deprived,
thus decreasing well-being. In this case, ¯c < 0.
Conversely, well-being may actually increase with own caste expenditure.10 This may
happen when people take others' consumption to predict their own future level of ex-
penditure. In that case, the higher the level of expenditure in the caste, the higher the
expected level of own expenditure. Because expectations improve, well-being increases as
well (Hirschman and Rothschild (1973); see Card et al. (2012) for a formalization). When
this informational e®ect overwhelms envy, ¯c > 0. These two e®ects may also cancel each
other out (¯c = 0).
Within-caste insurance mechanisms might also partly o®set the negative feelings trig-
gered by envy, not forgetting altruism (or fellowship feelings) toward people from the
same caste.11
The impact of rival castes' expenditure is also hard to predict. The literature often
assumes that comparison occurs among similar people. In India, however, caste rivalries
appear so important (section 2.1) that we could expect ¯r < 0. Some signal e®ect may,
however, also exist. Because occupation is partly determined by caste, castes are com-
plementary rather than substitutes. Improvements in a given caste's economic conditions
may thus act as a signal for its rivals as well. In this case, we could also have ¯r = 0 or
¯r > 0. However, there are obviously no between-caste informal insurance mechanisms,
nor should any \between-rival-caste" fellowship feelings be expected.
In a next stage, we study separately the relative utility functions of low castes and
higher castes. In a 1949 article, Duesenberry posited that comparisons are mostly upward
looking. Individuals at the bottom of the social ladder do indeed compare themselves to
those above them, but individuals at the top of the ladder do not focus on those below
them. In India, the social hierarchy is strict and well-known. Following Duesenberry's
logic, only low castes should compare themselves to higher castes.
The intensity of within-caste comparisons may also vary with the caste. This could
happen where the intensity of, and balance between, envy and signal / fellowship / insur-
ance mechanisms di®ers from low castes to higher castes.
10We draw here from the rich set of explanations developed in Kingdon and Knight (2007).
11Envy has often been found to dominate the informational e®ect in developed countries (Clark et al.
(2008), Card et al. (2012)). In developing countries, the evidence is mixed (Clark and Senik (2011)).
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3 Databases
Our analysis makes joint use of two databases. The ¯rst is the \Survey on Preferences
toward, and Satisfaction with, Life" (SPSL). This survey comprises a three-year panel
collected in six of the ten largest Indian cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai,
Kolkata, and Hyderabad) in January 2009, 2010 and 2011, covering 1,857, 1,280, and
1,037 respondents, respectively. Fewer observations than these are usable for regressions
due to missing survey response information and inconsistent answers across waves. The
data was collected in keeping with the following design. Each city was divided into
four areas. Fifteen residential districts were randomly selected in each area. Indigenous
interviewers were sent to interview ¯ve subjects face to face in each residential district.
Interviewers were free to choose on which door to knock, but they were required to comply
with two rules: (i) they could not interview a subject living next to other subjects, (ii) the
distributions of gender and age category in the collected data set had to be as designed.
For the surveys in 2010 and 2011, interviewers went back to the subjects' homes if they
had not moved.
In addition to demographic questions covering age, gender, years of education, monthly
and annual household expenditure levels, caste information and so forth,12 the question-
naire contained the following happiness question:
Overall, how happy would you say you are currently? Using a scale from 0 {
10 where 10 is very happy and 0 is very unhappy. How would you rate you
current level of happiness?
The caste information in the SPSL calls for caution for two reasons. First, the ¯rst
wave did not collect any information on caste. We thus have to extrapolate this informa-
tion from the subsequent two waves of data. This should be ¯ne since caste membership
is exogenously assigned at birth. Second, a sizable part of the SPSL sample changed caste
between the second wave (January 2010) and the third wave (January 2011). Speci¯cally,
38% of observations concern those respondents who changed their caste in the course of
the survey. We call these respondents \movers". These changes are surprising, as they do
not occur for other variables such as education or gender. We hypothesize these changes
to be due to the announcement (May 2010) of the ¯rst Caste Census since 1931. Low caste
members indeed su®er from a strong stigma. Yet, at the same time, they bene¯t from
12The de¯nition of castes in the survey took up the de¯nition in the National Sample Survey for
comparability.
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extensive a±rmative action programs (mostly quotas in administration and education).
For that reason, people may be willing to manipulate their caste identity (from low caste
to a higher caste or vice versa), especially when the government is known to be collecting
this information. Some respondents may have confused the SPSL with this Caste Census,
consequently deciding to adjust their caste identity.13
For that reason, in the following analyses we de¯ne respondents' castes as they were
given in the wave prior to the announcement of the Caste Census (i.e. the second wave).
For the regression analyses, as a robustness check, we tried regression where we dropped
all the respondents who changed caste in the course of the survey. We obtained the same
results as with the whole sample, which suggests that movers do not raise sample selection
problems (see section 4.2).
When using the abovementioned happiness equation, we need proxy variables for oth-
ers' expenditure levels. This calls for the second data set, which has a greater number of
observations: given the small sample size of the SPSL, it is not a good idea to compute
reference expenditure levels within the data set for the range of cells de¯ned by individual
characteristics. Thus we need the second database. We make use of the \Employment
and Unemployment Survey" by the National Sample Survey O±ce, which is a part larger,
socially representative survey program called the National Sample Survey (NSS). The last
two waves of this survey were collected from July 2007 to June 2008, and from July 2009
to June 2010 respectively (with respective sample sizes of about 750,000 and 460,000).
See Imbert and Papp (2013) for more survey details.
When interviewing a household, the NSS measures average monthly household expen-
diture for the previous year. We thus match the January 2008 { June 2008, July 2009
{ December 2009, and January 2010 { June 2010 monthly household expenditure infor-
mation from the NSS with the 2009, 2010, and 2011 waves of the SPSL respectively. In
the six cities we study, the sample sizes of these NSS subsets are 9,712, 6,731 and 6,561
respectively. All our computations use the weights provided in the NSS. The average
number of NSS observations used to compute the median household expenditure level
in each reference group for each year can be found under each regression table. When
performing the main regression described in the previous sub-section, this number is 32
for the within-caste comparison variable and 26 for the between-caste variable.
Table 1 compares the SPSL and the NSS samples with respect to the main population
13A small body of literature exists on the manipulation of caste identity to obtain caste advantages.
See Cassan (2012).
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characteristics we are interested in.14 The median level of household expenditure is fairly
similar in both samples. The caste distribution in the SPSL appears to be partly imbal-
anced, with the share of Scheduled Tribes giving cause for concern: they represent 8.33%
of the SPSL, and 1.26% of the NSS. The distribution of education is not equal across the
two samples, but there is no clear shift in general education between them. The sample
from the SPSL also appears to be signi¯cantly older.
Perfect representativeness of the sample answering the happiness question is not neces-
sary to recover the parameters from the utility function. The sample used should, however,
resemble the general population enough to avoid getting a result fallaciously driven by
an over-represented sub-population. Hence the concern about the Scheduled Tribes, who
are clearly over-represented in our sample. For that reason, we test the robustness of our
result to the exclusion of these respondents, and we are happy to report that the results
obtained in this paper are robust to the exclusion.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we estimate the happiness equation (1), but ¯rst consider a variation in
the de¯nition of the reference expenditure variables. In keeping with the literature, we
include only one reference expenditure variable in the happiness equation, by considering
the reference group to be \similar others" (Clark and Oswald 1996) irrespective of the
respondents' castes. We consider the cell de¯ned by age bracket, level of education and
location, which is the same as Ferrer-i-Carbonell's (2005) de¯nition of the reference group.
The reference variable we include into the regression, log(ygeneralit), is thus de¯ned as the
logarithm of the median real household expenditure level for those who share i's level
of education, age, and location during year t. This ¯rst stage analysis is called \general
comparison" because we do not cluster the reference group by caste.
We then add caste information, bringing log(ycasteit) and log(yrivalit) into the regression
instead of log(ygeneralit). Here, again, we focus on how individuals compare themselves to
people similar to them, both in their own caste and in rival castes. The variable ln(ycasteit)
(log(yrivalit)) is thus de¯ned as the logarithm of the median real household expenditure
14We restrict the NSS sample to individuals matching the SPSL restrictions: only people over 20, living
in one of the six cities studied in the SPSL. For the sake of simplicity, we compare the SPSL with the
last wave of the NSS. In the SPSL, the sampling procedure is designed to be random at city level. The
number of individuals drawn from each city is, however, the same by design. To ensure comparability
with the NSS, we thus weight each observation according to the share of its city among the six cities in
which respondents live.
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level for those in i's caste (rival castes) who share i's level of education, age, and location
during year t. In constructing these reference expenditure variables, we consider median
household expenditure at year t rather than the average. The median is used because it
is less sensitive to outliers. See Clark et al. (2009) on this point.
In a last stage, we run the same regression separately on low and higher castes to
check whether low and higher castes di®er in the way they compare themselves to one
another.
The variables determining the reference groups are de¯ned as follow. Education is
de¯ned by seven categories, from \illiterate" to \graduate and above" (see table 5 for
details). Three age groups are considered, each containing 1/3 of the adult population
in the cities we study. The happiness survey's respondents live in six cities: Bangalore,
Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai. Respondents can be Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Castes or Other (i.e. higher castes). These variables
are also added as covariates in the regression, together with labor force status, number of
children, family status, gender and wave.
Our main analyses use pooled cross-sections OLS. In this case, the standard errors are
clustered at the respondent's peer group level. We then add individual-speci¯c ¯xed-e®ects
to exploit the panel structure of the data set, and check the consistency of the results. The
¯xed-e®ect and pooled-OLS regressions actually generate very similar results, in terms of
both sign and signi¯cance. However, due to the small sample size of our SPSL dataset, we
prefer the results for pooled OLS since adding ¯xed-e®ects into the regressions attenuates
the variance in the data, and thus increases the variance in the estimated coe±cients,
which in turn arti¯cially in°ates some coe±cients. See Luttmer (2005) for potential
problems in ¯xed e®ects regressions of happiness equations.
4.1 Findings
Table 2 displays our main results. As mentioned above, we ¯rst consider the general
setting in which the reference group is de¯ned irrespective of the respondents' castes,
by taking Ferrer-i-Carbonell's (2005) de¯nition of the reference group. This regression
gives us a general idea of the impact of comparisons in India. The average number of
observations used to calculate reference expenditure is 63.
The ¯rst column of Table 2 suggests that others' expenditure reduces happiness
sharply, with a statistical signi¯cance of 1%. This result is consistent with ¯ndings in
China (Knight and Gunatilaka (2011)), for instance, but contrasts with observations in
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former communist countries during the transition period (Senik 2004, 2008). 15 Re-
markably, comparisons appear to a®ect well-being to the same extent as own household
expenditure does.
The second column factors in the comparison e®ects whereby respondents may com-
pare themselves di®erently to people from their own caste than to people from rival
castes. We consequently split the reference group into two, replacing log(ygeneralit) with
our above-de¯ned within-caste and between-castes comparison variables log(ycasteit) and
log(yrivalit).
As described in section 2.3, comparisons with similar others within the caste could be
expected to have a null or maybe positive impact. Given that India is a rapidly changing
country, we could expect Indians to take others' expenditure to predict their own future
consumption. The \informational e®ect" could thus be strong enough to o®set envy. Sim-
ilarly, caste de¯nes identity so strongly that we could expect close caste fellowship feelings,
which could again override within-caste jealousy. We, however, found that comparisons
with similar others within the caste appear to a®ect well-being negatively ( ^¯c < 0). Envy
hence appears to be stronger than fellowship feelings and informational e®ects. The fact
that the coe±cient is signi¯cant at 10-% tends to mitigate this conclusion, but we will
see below that within-caste comparisons do actually matter for half the caste hierarchy.
The rival castes' economic successes also appear to enter negatively into the well-being
function. Between-caste comparisons indeed have a large, negative, 1%-signi¯cant impact
on well-being ( ^¯r < 0).
Between-castes comparisons appears to reduce well-being remarkably more than within-
caste comparisons (the di®erence between the two coe±cients is signi¯cant at a 5% level
in a two-sided test). This result evokes Carlsson et al.'s ¯nding: the authors ¯nd own
caste's income to a®ect well-being less than the average income level in the rest of the
society (including rival castes).
Between-caste comparisons even appear to a®ect well-being as much as own expen-
diture, in absolute value. This sheds light on very strong relative concerns about rival
castes, obviously exacerbated by the tensions structuring the Indian caste system. This
¯nding contrasts with the case of South Africa, where comparisons between black and
white seem to increase well-being, and with the case of China, where the same is found
for comparisons between migrants and non-migrants. In both these cases, the signal e®ect
appears to be stronger than envy. In India, castes are also very complementary, which
15See Clark and Senik (2011) for a general review of the importance of relative feelings of disadvantage
in developing countries.
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makes it plausible for rival castes' expenditure to act as a strong signal. However, tensions
between high and low castes are so strong that envy widely overwhelms this signal e®ect.
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 present the analysis for low castes and then
for higher castes. We ¯nd that the relative utility function di®ers drastically depending on
one's position in the caste hierarchy. First, whereas an increase in own caste's expenditure
decreases well-being for higher caste members (1% signi¯cance), low-caste members are
found to be una®ected by such a change. Within-group economic competition is thus
likely to matter more at the top of the caste hierarchy. At the same time, higher castes
do not seem to pay so much attention to the economic situation of low castes (small
insigni¯cant impact). Strikingly, however, low-caste Indians are strongly, and negatively
a®ected by the economic successes and failures of higher-caste Indians. This result tends to
bear out Duesenberry's view that individuals are mostly upward-looking when comparing
themselves to others.
4.2 Robustness Checks
The validity of the previous results is tested along two main lines. Given that some
respondents changed their castes in the course of the survey (see section 3), we have to
check that they are not driving the results. We also check whether the results hold when
adding individual ¯xed-e®ects to the regression.
Non-movers are respondents for which the reported caste has been collected more than
once (i.e. who did not drop out during the course of the survey) and who did not change
their caste. Table 3 displays the results obtained for this sub-sample. Despite the e®ect
of the smaller sample size on both magnitudes and signi¯cance, these ¯gures appear to
be pretty similar to what we have found previously.
The results are also found to be robust to the inclusion of individual-speci¯c intercepts.
Because adding ¯xed-e®ects amounts to centering the variables at the individual level,
and due to the sample's small size, the estimates are quite in°ated. Table 4, however,
shows both signs and signi¯cance to be consistent with the previous results. This stability
strongly supports our previous conclusions.
Additionally, we test the results' robustness to the exclusion of the Scheduled Tribes,
both in pooled-cross sections and with ¯xed-e®ects. As evoked in section 3, this category
is oversampled. Running the analysis again without Scheduled Tribes does not change
the results.
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5 Concluding Comments
Individuals are often implicitly assumed to compare themselves to their peers. In the
Indian context, however, this view is subject to caution. Strong tensions are known to
exist between clearly dissociated social groups, the castes. Consequently, both between-
caste comparisons and within-caste comparisons are likely to be of importance.
Using a unique Indian panel data set, we show that the caste system in°uences the
way Indians compare themselves to one another, and that the comparison scheme is
asymmetrical. Only low castes care about the economic successes of their rivals, and only
high-caste Indians compete with their fellows. The fact that comparisons between rival
castes are made by low-caste Indians bears out Duesenberry's view that individuals at
the bottom of the hierarchy compare themselves to those at the top, but that the reverse
does not hold. Our results on between-caste comparisons contrast with previous research
in South Africa and China. In these countries, between-group comparisons are found to
increase happiness. In the case of India, existing tensions between rival castes are very
likely to explain this di®erence: even though low and higher castes are complementary,
these tensions are strong enough to lead envy to widely overwhelm the signal e®ect.
Unlike Linssen et al. (2011), who worked on data on rural India, our data was collected
in urban areas in India. While we expected signaling e®ects to pertain in rapidly growing
urban areas, it is interesting that we obtained otherwise. We call for further happiness
research in India, as the accumulated evidence in the country is still scarce and our
analysis should be conducted again with di®erent data sets.
Appendix
This section provides the results obtained from a simple happiness regression without
including a reference expenditure variable. Table 5 shows the coe±cients we obtain both
in pooled cross-section OLS and ¯xed-e®ect OLS. We focus here on describing the ¯rst
regression's coe±cients.
As expected, log real household expenditure has a positive and very signi¯cant im-
pact. Education improves well-being monotonically. Other things being equal (household
expenditure included), any labor status appears to be better than working, except being
a \housewife or househusband" (97.6% of people belonging to this category are actually
women). The di±cult working conditions in developing countries certainly drive much of
this result. \Not working" increases well-being as compared to the situation where the
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respondent has a job. This result can be understood by noticing ¯rst that this category
consists of 70% of women. It is quite likely that most of these respondents are women at
the head of the household, with another woman doing the housekeeping tasks (daughter,
daughter-in-law, etc). Consequently, they do not consider themselves as being housewives,
and declare themselves to be unoccupied instead.
Having between one and three children does not a®ect happiness, as compared to
having no children. Having more than three children, however, signi¯cantly decreases
happiness. This pattern is pretty similar to the pattern observed in developed countries.
The rest of the family status variables surprisingly do not seem to have any signi¯cant
impact. Age and gender also appear to have no signi¯cant impact. On the contrary, both
the place of residence and the year have strong e®ects on well-being.
Not surprisingly, belonging to one of the Other Backward Castes instead of belonging
to a higher caste (omitted category) decreases happiness. However, being neither from
a Scheduled Caste nor a Scheduled Tribe has a signi¯cant negative impact. This result
appears quite puzzling. Interestingly, it is quite similar to what Linssen et al. (2011)
obtain. They ¯nd that belonging to a Scheduled Caste/Tribe or to an Other Backward
Caste has no signi¯cant impact on well-being, as compared to belonging to a higher caste.
Still, caste in°uences expenditure and education, which in turn a®ect happiness. However,
once we control for those variables a®ected by caste membership, caste does not appear
to a®ect well-being as much as might have been expected.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, NSS & SPSL
NSS SPSL
Caste (%)
Other Backward Castes 30.06 26.39
Scheduled Castes 13.66 15.09
Scheduled Tribes 1.26 8.33
Neo-Buddhists { 1.42
General Population 55.02 48.77
Education (%)
Illiterate 12.80 12.84
Literate, formal schooling < 4 years 4.71 1.34
Primary 9.73 6.80
Middle/upper primary 14.73 24.07
Secondary/higher secondary 31.44 31.24
College, but not graduate 1.74 5.91
Graduate and + 24.86 17.81
Median age 35 44
Median household expenditures (real, 2005) 5803 6083
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Table 2: OLS regression on happiness, pooled cross-sections, main results
General Within & Between Low castes Higher castes
comparisons comparisons only only
log(Household expenditure) 0.517** 0.549** 0.554** 0.516**
(0.077) (0.083) (0.118) (0.111)
log(General ref. expenditure) -0.644** - - -
(0.216) - - -
log(Within-caste ref. expenditure) - -0.150+ -0.030 -0.877**
- (0.080) (0.086) (0.228)
log(Between-caste ref. expenditure) - -0.608** -0.761** -0.168
- (0.161) (0.191) (0.285)
Num. Obs. 2908 2590 1288 1302
R-Squared 0.1728 0.1796 0.2213 0.2105
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis { sample clustered by (age category £ education £ city £
caste). Other controls: education, labor force status, number of children, family status, age category,
gender, city, caste, wave. Average number of observations used to compute the reference expenditure
variables in each cell for each year: ¯rst column, 63; second column, 32 and 26; third column, 15 and 32;
fourth column, 50 and 20.
Table 3: OLS regression on happiness, pooled cross-sections, non-movers only
General Within & Between Low castes Higher castes
comparisons comparisons only only
log(Household expenditure) 0.647** 0.682** 0.654** 0.591**
(0.102) (0.107) (0.185) (0.133)
log(General ref. expenditure) -0.684* - - -
(0.292) - - -
log(Within-caste ref. expenditure) - -0.258 -0.210 -0.639*
- (0.220) (0.221) (0.318)
log(Between-caste ref. expenditure) - -0.816** -1.191** -0.420
- (0.222) (0.264) (0.283)
Num. Obs. 1240 1151 398 753
R-Squared 0.2304 0.2535 0.3682 0.2603
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis { sample clustered by (age category £ education £ city £
caste). Other controls: education, labor force status, number of children, family status, age category,
gender, city, caste, wave. Average number of observations used to compute the reference expenditure
variables in each cell for each year: ¯rst column, 58; second column, 41 and 15; third column, 22 and 18;
fourth column, 52 and 14.
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Table 4: OLS regression on happiness, with individual ¯xed-e®ects
General Within & Between Low castes Higher castes
comparisons comparisons only only
log(Household expenditure) 0.383** 0.412** 0.357* 0.468**
(0.102) (0.110) (0.156) (0.152)
log(General ref. expenditure) -0.987** - - -
(0.191) - - -
log(Within-caste ref. expenditure) - -0.329* -0.224 -1.296**
- (0.133) (0.149) (0.261)
log(Between-caste ref. expenditure) - -0.918** -1.268** -0.336
- (0.149) (0.200) (0.238)
Num. Obs. 3340 2590 1288 1302
R-Squared 0.0567 0.0697 0.2087 0.0660
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis { sample clustered by (age category £ education £ city £
caste). Other controls: education, labor force status, number of children, family status, age category,
gender, city, caste, wave. Average number of observations used to compute the reference expenditure
variables in each cell for each year: ¯rst column, 66; second column, 32 and 26; third column, 15 and 32;
fourth column, 50 and 20.
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Table 5: Pooled and Fixed-e®ect regressions on happiness, no comparison variable
Pooled OLS Fixed-e®ect OLS
log(Household expenditure) 0.510** 0.067 0.343** 0.102
Education (omitted: illiterate)
literate but schooling < 4 years 0.337 0.275 -0.604 1.172
primary 0.060 0.152 -1.137 2.013
middle/upper primary 0.308** 0.115 -0.605 1.088
secondary/Higher secondary 0.416** 0.115 -0.620 1.192
college, not graduate 0.449** 0.165 0.329 1.799
gradutate + 0.662** 0.131 -0.570 1.424
Labor force status (omitted: employed)
not working (excl. housewife/husband) 0.533** 0.160 0.634** 0.233
housewife/husband 0.069 0.104 0.245 0.165
retired 0.383** 0.127 0.538** 0.206
student 0.300 0.183 0.570* 0.269
# of children category (omitted: no children)
1-3 -0.059 0.117 0.051 0.208
> 3 -0.294+ 0.150 0.014 0.322
Single without parents -0.379 0.285 0.036 0.443
Single with parents 0.106 0.178 -0.032 0.256
Married with parents -0.079 0.081 -0.306* 0.136
Other -0.122 0.092 -0.157 0.136
Age category (omitted: 20-27)
28-41 -0.076 0.118 0.481 0.413
42+ -0.153 0.119 0.419 0.503
Gender (omitted: male) - -
female 0.017 0.097 - -
City (omitted: Delhi) - -
Mumbai 0.506** 0.113 - -
Bengaluru -0.739** 0.144 - -
Chennai 0.165 0.116 - -
Kolkata -0.799** 0.110 - -
Hyderabad 0.108 0.110 - -
Wave (omitted: 2009)
2010 0.362** 0.075 0.266** 0.085
2011 0.700** 0.077 0.601** 0.092
Other Backward Castes -0.270** 0.089 - -
Scheduled Castes -0.030 0.098 - -
Scheduled Tribes -0.134 0.133 - -
Neo-Buddhists 0.101 0.278 - -
intercept 2.342** 0.604 3.846** 1.344
Num. Obs. 2926 3361
R-squared 0.1672 0.0420
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Standard errors in the right columns.
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